Weak bayesian coherentism

Synthese 157 (3):337 - 346 (2007)
Recent results in probability theory have cast doubt on coherentism, purportedly showing (a) that coherence among a set of beliefs cannot raise their probability unless individual beliefs have some independent credibility, and (b) that no possible measure of coherence makes coherence generally probability-enhancing. I argue that coherentists can reject assumptions on which these theorems depend, and I derive a general condition under which the concurrence of two information sources lacking individual credibility can raise the probability of what they report.
Keywords Coherence  Probability  Bayesianism
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Michael Huemer (2011). The Puzzle of Metacoherence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):1-21.

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