Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-realist Philosophy of Arithmetic

Rodopi (2006)
In this book a non-realist philosophy of mathematics is presented. Two ideas are essential to its conception. These ideas are (i) that pure mathematics--taken in isolation from the use of mathematical signs in empirical judgement--is an activity for which a formalist account is roughly correct, and (ii) that mathematical signs nonetheless have a sense, but only in and through belonging to a system of signs with empirical application. This conception is argued by the two authors and is critically discussed by three philosophers of mathematics.
Keywords formalism  realism  anti-realism  non-realism  Quine  Frege  Peano  Wittgenstein  Russell  Carnap
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ISBN(s) 9042020474   9789042020474  
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