A semantics for means-end relations

Synthese 158 (2):207 - 231 (2007)
There has been considerable work on practical reasoning in artificial intelligence and also in philosophy. Typically, such reasoning includes premises regarding means–end relations. A clear semantics for such relations is needed in order to evaluate proposed syllogisms. In this paper, we provide a formal semantics for means–end relations, in particular for necessary and sufficient means–end relations. Our semantics includes a non-monotonic conditional operator, so that related practical reasoning is naturally defeasible. This work is primarily an exercise in conceptual analysis, aimed at clarifying and eventually evaluating existing theories of practical reasoning (pending a similar analysis regarding desires, intentions and other relevant concepts).
Keywords Means–end relations  Propositional dynamic logic  Formal semantics  Practical reasoning
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DOI 10.2307/27653587
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References found in this work BETA
Sven Ove Hansson (2000). Formalization in Philosophy. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):162-175.

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Ilkka Niiniluoto (2014). Values in Design Sciences. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:11-15.

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