Frege on Identities
History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (3):195-205 (2000)
| Abstract | The idea underlying the Begriffsschrift account of identities was that the content of a sentence is a function of the things it is about. If so, then if an identity a=b is about the content of its contained terms and is true, then a=a and a=b have the same content. But they do not have the same content; so, Frege concluded, identities are not about the contents of their contained terms. The way Frege regarded the matter is that in an identity the terms flanking the symbol for identity do not have their ordinary contents, but instead have themselves as their contents. In 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung' Frege became convinced that if an identity a=b is about the signs a and b, then it expresses no proper knowledge. So, since it is evident that many such identities do express proper knowledge, Frege concluded that identities are not about their contained signs. So he became convinced that his Begriffsschrift account was incorrect. What was the error in the argument that led Frege to that account? It was thinking that the content of a sentence is a function of the contents of its constituent signs, that is, the things it is about. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Frege identities content Dummett | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesPhilip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2000). Frege on Identities. History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (3):195-205.
Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2000). Frege on Identities. History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (3):195-205.
James Levine (2002). Analysis and Decomposition in Frege and Russell. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):195-216.
Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock (1986). On Frege's Two Notions of Sense. History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (1):31-41.
Matthew Rellihan (forthcoming). Informational Semantics and Frege Cases. Acta Analytica:1-28.
Robert May (2012). What Frege's Theory of Identity is Not. Thought 1 (1):41-48.
Wolfgang Künne (1997). Propositions in Bolzano and Frege. Grazer Philosophische Studien 53:203-240.
Stephen Yablo (2012). Carving Content at the Joints. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (5):145-177.
Michael Dummett (1982). Objectivity and Reality in Lotze and Frege. Inquiry 25 (1):95 – 114.
Gregory Currie (1983). I. Interpreting Frege: A Reply to Michael Dummett. Inquiry 26 (3):345 – 359.
Markus Stepanians (2003). Why Frege Thought It to Be "Probable" That Truth is Indefinable. Manuscrito 26 (2):331-345.
Kelly Dean Jolley (2008). (Kivy on) the Form–Content Identity Thesis. British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2):193-204.
Michael Dummett (1976). I. Frege as a Realist. Inquiry 19 (1-4):455-468.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-02-28Total downloads19 ( #64,458 of 549,694 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,807 of 549,694 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
