Intentionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of Arthur Prior

kluwer (1996)
This book says Prior claims: (1) that a sentence never names; (2) what a sentence says cannot be otherwise signified; and (3) that a sentence says what it says whatever the type of its occurrence; (4) and that quantifications binding sentential variables are neither eliminable, substitutional, nor referential. The book develops and defends (1)-(3). It also defends (4) against the sorts of strictures on quantification of such philosophers as Quine and Davidson.
Keywords Prior  propositions  intentionality  truth
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ISBN(s) 0792341198   9780792341192
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    Alexander Steinberg (2013). Pleonastic Possible Worlds. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):767-789.
    Similar books and articles
    Henry Jackman (1998). James' Pragmatic Account of Intentionality and Truth. Transactions of the Charles s Peirce Society 34 (1):155-181.
    A. N. Prior (1968). Intentionality and Intensionality, Part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:91-106.

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