Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 64 (4):336 (1997)
|Abstract||A general account of modeling in physics is proposed. Modeling is shown to involve three components: denotation, demonstration, and interpretation. Elements of the physical world are denoted by elements of the model; the model possesses an internal dynamic that allows us to demonstrate theoretical conclusions; these in turn need to be interpreted if we are to make predictions. The DDI account can be readily extended in ways that correspond to different aspects of scientific practice|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Martijn Meeter, Janneke Jehee & Jaap Murre (2007). Neural Models That Convince: Model Hierarchies and Other Strategies to Bridge the Gap Between Behavior and the Brain. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):749 – 772.
Anguel Stefanov (2012). Theoretical Models as Representations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43 (1):67-76.
Otávio Bueno (2006). Representation at the Nanoscale. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):617-628.
Steffen Ducheyne (2005). Lessons From Galileo: The Pragmatic Model of Shared Characteristics of Scientific Representation. Philosophia Naturalis 42 (2).
Gabriele Contessa (2007). Representing Reality: The Ontology of Scientific Models and Their Representational Function. Dissertation, University of London
Adam Toon (2010). Models as Make-Believe. In Roman Frigg & Matthew Hunter (eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science. Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science.
Axel Gelfert (2011). Mathematical Formalisms in Scientific Practice: From Denotation to Model-Based Representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):272-286.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads99 ( #8,023 of 739,304 )
Recent downloads (6 months)16 ( #8,001 of 739,304 )
How can I increase my downloads?