Means-end relations and a measure of efficacy

Abstract
Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) provides a natural setting for semantics of means-end relations involving non-determinism, but such models do not include probabilistic features common to much practical reasoning involving means and ends. We alter the semantics for PDL by adding probabilities to the transition systems and interpreting dynamic formulas 〈α〉 ϕ as fuzzy predicates about the reliability of α as a means to ϕ. This gives our semantics a measure of efficacy for means-end relations.
Keywords means-end relations  fuzzy modal logic  propositional dynamic logic  efficacy
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DOI 10.1007/s10849-005-9008-4
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References found in this work BETA
Mark A. Brown (1988). On the Logic of Ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (1):1 - 26.
Helmut Prendinger & Gerhard Schurz (1996). Reasoning About Action and Change. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 5 (2):209-245.
Georg Henrik von Wright (1963). Practical Inference. Philosophical Review 72 (2):159-179.

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