Null Sentences
Iyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48:23-36 (1999)
| Abstract | In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Wittgenstein Tractatus null sentences | |||||||||
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