Graduate studies at Western
Inquiry 49 (6):547 – 572 (2006)
|Abstract||I offer a critical reconstruction of Kant's thesis that aesthetic judgement is founded on the principle of the purposiveness of nature. This has been taken as equivalent to the claim that aesthetics is directly linked to the systematicity of nature in its empirical laws. I take issue both with Henry Allison, who seeks to marginalize this claim, and with Avner Baz, who highlights it in order to argue that Kant's aesthetics are merely instrumental for his epistemology. My solution is that aesthetic judgement operates as an exemplary presentation of our general ability to schematise an intuition with a concept at the empirical level. I suggest that this counts as an empirical schematism. Although aesthetic judgement is not based on empirical systematicity, it can nevertheless offer indirect support for the latter in so far as it is a particular revelation of purposiveness in general.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Immanuel Kant (2007/2005). Critique of Judgement. Oxford University Press.
Avner Baz (2005). Kant's Principle of Purposiveness and the Missing Point of (Aesthetic) Judgements. Kantian Review 10 (1):1-32.
K. Gorodeisky (2011). A Tale of Two Faculties. British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (4):415-436.
Alon Chasid (2004). Why the Pictorial Relation is Not Reference. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):226-247.
Robert Hopkins (2000). Beauty and Testimony. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47:209-236.
Miles Rind (2003). Kant's Beautiful Roses: A Response to Cohen's ‘Second Problem’. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (1):65-74.
Luigi Caranti (2005). Logical Purposiveness and the Principle of Taste. Kant-Studien 96 (3):364-374.
Rui Zhu (2002). Wu-Wei: Lao-Zi, Zhuang-Zi and the Aesthetic Judgement. Asian Philosophy 12 (1):53 – 63.
Jenny McMahon (2010). The Classical Trinity and Kant's Aesthetic Formalism. Critical Horizons 11 (3):419-441.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads36 ( #38,186 of 740,483 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,742 of 740,483 )
How can I increase my downloads?