Prior and Lorenzen on Quantification

Grazer Philosophishe Studien 41:150-173 (1991)
A case against Prior’s theory of propositions goes thus: (1) everyday propositional generalizations are not substitutional; (2) Priorean quantifications are not objectual; (3) quantifications are substitutional if not objectual; (4) thus, Priorean quantifications are substitutional; (5) thus that Priorean quantifications are not ontologically committed to propositions provides no basis for a similar claim about our everyday propositional generalizations. Prior agrees with (1) and (2). He rejects (3), but fails to support that rejection with an account of quantification on which there could be quantifications that are neither substitutional nor objectual. The paper draws from the work of Lorenzen an alternative conception of quantification in terms of which that needed account can be given.
Keywords Prior  Paul Lorenzen  quantification  generalization
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DOI 10.5840/gps19914146
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