Same-kind coincidence and the ship of theseus

Mind 106 (421):53-67 (1997)
Locke thought that it was impossible for there to be two things of the same kind in the same place at the same time. I offer (what looks to me like) a counterexample to that principle, involving two ships in the same place at the same time. I then consider two ways of explaining away, and one way of denying, the apparent counterexample of Locke's principle, and I argue that none is successful. I conclude that, although the case under discussion does not refute Locke's principle, it constitutes a serious challenge to it.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/106.421.53
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Daniel Z. Korman (2016). Ordinary Objects. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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