There Is A Problem with Substitutional Quantification

Theoria 68 (1):4-12 (2002)
Whereas arithmetical quantification is substitutional in the sense that a some-quantification is true only if some instance of it is true, it does not follow (and, in fact, is not true) that an account of the truth-conditions of the sentences of the language of arithmetic can be given by a substitutional semantics. A substitutional semantics fails in a most fundamental fashion: it fails to articulate the truth-conditions of the quantifications with which it is concerned. This is what is defended in the paper. In particular, it is defended against remarks to the contrary in a well known paper on the subject.
Keywords Quine  Kripke  substitutional quantification  arithmetic  Davidson
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2002.tb00117.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Saul A. Kripke (1976). Is There a Problem About Substitutional Quantification? In Gareth Evans & John McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning. Oxford University Press 324-419.
Marian David (2006). A Substitutional Theory of Truth? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):182–189.
Francesca Boccuni (2013). Plural Logicism. Erkenntnis 78 (5):1051-1067.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

61 ( #55,906 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #183,615 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.