There Is A Problem with Substitutional Quantification

Theoria 68 (1):4-12 (2002)
Abstract Whereas arithmetical quantification is substitutional in the sense that a some-quantification is true only if some instance of it is true, it does not follow (and, in fact, is not true) that an account of the truth-conditions of the sentences of the language of arithmetic can be given by a substitutional semantics. A substitutional semantics fails in a most fundamental fashion: it fails to articulate the truth-conditions of the quantifications with which it is concerned. This is what is defended in the paper. In particular, it is defended against remarks to the contrary in a well known paper on the subject.
Keywords Quine  Kripke  substitutional quantification  arithmetic  Davidson
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,875
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Saul A. Kripke (1976). Is There a Problem About Substitutional Quantification? In Gareth Evans & John McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning. Oxford University Press.
    Marian David (2006). A Substitutional Theory of Truth? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):182–189.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-09-13

    Total downloads

    46 ( #24,347 of 556,907 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    5 ( #16,193 of 556,907 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums