Theories of truth and semantical primitives

Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):349 - 354 (1977)
Robert cummins has recently attacked this line of argument: if p is a semantically primitive predicate of a first order language l, then p requires its own clause in the definition of satisfaction integral to a definition of truth of l. thus if l has infinitely many such p, the satisfaction clause cannot be completed and truth for l will remain undefined. against this cummins argues that a single clause in a general base theory for l can specify satisfaction conditions for even infinitely many semantically primitive predicates of l. against cummins we argue that a general base theory contains a primitive expression 'applies to' and that to make his case cummins would need to prove this expression stands for a semantical relation sufficient to a truth definition for l. not only is such a proof lacking but we show the claim to be altogether dubious
Keywords Robert Cummins  theory of truth  satisfaction
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DOI 10.1007/BF00262067
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Robert C. Cummins (1977). Reply to Hugly and Sayward. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):353-354.

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