The regularity account of relational spacetime
Mind 115 (457):41--73 (2006)
| Abstract | A version of relationism that takes spatiotemporal structures—spatial geometry and a standard of inertia—to supervene on the history of relations between bodies is described and defended. The account is used to explain how the relationist should construe models of Newtonian mechanics in which absolute acceleration manifestly does not supervene on the relations; Ptolemaic and Copernican models for example. The account introduces a new way in which a Lewis-style ‘best system’ might capture regularities in a broadly Humean world; a defence is given against a charge of indeterminism that applies to any such approach to laws. | |||||||||
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Holly Andersen (2011). Mechanisms, Laws, and Regularities. Philosophy of Science 78 (2):325-331.
Nick Huggett (2000). Reflections on Parity Nonconservation. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):219-241.
Robert Disalle (1995). Spacetime Theory as Physical Geometry. Erkenntnis 42 (3):317-337.
Mariam Thalos (1999). In Favor of Being Only Humean. Philosophical Studies 93 (3):265-298.
Marc Lange (1993). Natural Laws and the Problem of Provisos. Erkenntnis 38 (2):233Ð248.
Nick Huggett (2003). Mirror Symmetry: What is It for Relational Space to Be Orientable? In Katherine Brading & Elena Castellani (eds.), Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections. Cambridge University Press.
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