Why Substitutional Quantification Does Not Express Existence

Theory and Decision 50:67-75 (1987)
Fundamental to Quine’s philosophy of logic is the thesis that substitutional quantification does not express existence. This paper considers the content of this claim and the reasons for thinking it is true.
Keywords substitutional quantification  quine  existence
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Philip Hugly, Why Substitutional Quantification Does Not Express Existence
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Francesca Boccuni (2013). Plural Logicism. Erkenntnis 78 (5):1051-1067.
Marian David (2006). A Substitutional Theory of Truth? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):182–189.
Charles Parsons (1982). Substitutional Quantification and Mathematics. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (4):409-421.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

114 ( #25,380 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #84,767 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.