David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Communication and Cognition 28 (4):409-25 (1995)
This paper is a discussion of Frege's maxim that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has a meaning. Quine reads the maxim as saying that the sentence is the fundamental unit of significance. Dummett rejects this as a truism. But it is not a truism since it stands in opposition to a conception of meaning held by John Locke and others. The maxim denies that a word has a sense independently of any sentence in which it occurs. Dummett says this denial is inconsistent with the fact that people understand sentences they have never heard before. The maxim is defended against this attack.
|Keywords||Locke Dummett Frege's maxim Quine|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
René van Woudenberg (2006). Conceivability and Modal Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):210–221.
Gregory Currie (1983). I. Interpreting Frege: A Reply to Michael Dummett. Inquiry 26 (3):345 – 359.
Jan Dejnožka (2010). Dummett's Forward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism. Diametros 25:118-131.
Michael Dummett (1976). I. Frege as a Realist. Inquiry 19 (1-4):455-468.
Jamie Anne Spiering (2011). “Liber Est Causa Sui”. Review of Metaphysics 65 (2):351-376.
Mark Textor (2000). Knowledge Transmission and Linguistic Sense. Theoria 15 (2):287-302.
Charles Parsons (1974). On Translating Logic. Synthese 27 (3-4):405 - 411.
Pieranna Garavaso (1991). Frege and the Analysis of Thoughts. History and Philosophy of Logic 12 (2):195-210.
Albert Casullo (1979). Reid and Mill on Hume's Maxim of Conceivability. Analysis 39 (4):212--219.
Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1999). Null Sentences. Iyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48:23-36.
Michael Dummett (1991). Frege and Other Philosophers. Clarendon Press.
Sanford Shieh (1998). On the Conceptual Foundations of Anti-Realism. Synthese 115 (1):33-70.
Markus Stepanians (2003). Why Frege Thought It to Be "Probable" That Truth is Indefinable. Manuscrito 26 (2):331-345.
Panu Raatikainen (2003). Is Quine a Verificationist? Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):399-409.
Added to index2011-01-24
Total downloads59 ( #26,623 of 1,102,759 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #46,777 of 1,102,759 )
How can I increase my downloads?