Testing Philosophical Claims about Science

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:468 - 475 (1992)
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Abstract

Relativism notwithstanding, evidence can be brought to bear on the sorts of empirical claims that scientists make. If progress is to be made in the study of science, comparable effort must be expended to interpret meta-level claims about science in such a way that evidence can be brought to bear on them as well. This endeavor requires us to get scientists to adopt our meta-level positions so that we can see the effects that such an adoption has on science.

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