Mind 114 (455):689-693 (2005)
|Abstract||Varzi has recently joined a thread of arguments originating in an attempt by Sorensen (1985) to demonstrate that the predicate ‘vague’ is itself vague. Sorensen's conclusion is significant in that it has provided the basis for a subsequent effort by Hyde (1994) to defend the legitimacy of supposing higher-order vagueness. Varzi's contribution to this debate is twofold. First, contra earlier criticism by Deas (1989), he claims that Sorensen's result is sound so far as it goes. Second, he argues that despite this it cannot be used as Hyde wishes on pain of circularity. I am not interested in the latter argument—it is examined in Hyde (2003)—but rather wish to defend and elaborate Deas's criticism of Sorensen against Varzi's repudiation.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Roy A. Sorensen (2000). A Vague Demonstration. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5):507-522.
Achille Varzi (2000). Unsharpenable Vagueness. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):1-10.
R. Sorensen (2010). Borderline Hermaphrodites: Higher-Order Vagueness by Example. Mind 119 (474):393-408.
Pablo Cobreros (2011). Varzi on Supervaluationism and Logical Consequence. Mind 120 (479):833-43.
Achille Varzi (2001). Vagueness in Geography. Philosophy and Geography 4 (1):49 – 65.
Michael Tye (1994). Why the Vague Need Not Be Higher-Order Vague. Mind 103 (409):43-45.
Achille C. Varzi (2005). The Vagueness of ‘Vague’: Rejoinder to Hull. Mind 114 (455):695-702.
Achille C. Varzi (2003). Higher-Order Vagueness and the Vagueness of ‘Vague’. Mind 112 (446):295–298.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #114,124 of 549,124 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,124 )
How can I increase my downloads?