Aleatory Explanations Expanded

Existing definitions of relevance relations are essentially ambiguous outside the binary case. Hence definitions of probabilistic causality based on relevance relations, as well as probability values based on maximal specificity conditions and homogeneous reference classes are also not uniquely specified. A 'neutral state' account of explanations is provided to avoid the problem, based on an earlier account of aleatory explanations by the author. Further reasons in support of this model are given, focusing on the dynamics of explanation. It is shown that truth in explanation need not entail maximal specificity and that probabilistic explanations should not contain a specification of probability values.
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James H. Fetzer (1982). Probabilistic Explanations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:194-207.
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