Foundations of Science 1 (1):119-130 (1995)
|Abstract||I argue here for a number of ways that modern computational science requires a change in the way we represent the relationship between theory and applications. It requires a switch away from logical reconstruction of theories in order to take surface mathematical syntax seriously. In addition, syntactically different versions of the same theory have important differences for applications, and this shows that the semantic account of theories is inappropriate for some purposes. I also argue against formalist approaches in the philosophy of science and for a greater role for perceptual knowledge rather than propositional knowledge in scientific empiricism.|
|Keywords||Computational science Theories Models Scientific instruments Syntax Semantics|
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