David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Foundations of Science 1 (1):119-130 (1995)
I argue here for a number of ways that modern computational science requires a change in the way we represent the relationship between theory and applications. It requires a switch away from logical reconstruction of theories in order to take surface mathematical syntax seriously. In addition, syntactically different versions of the same theory have important differences for applications, and this shows that the semantic account of theories is inappropriate for some purposes. I also argue against formalist approaches in the philosophy of science and for a greater role for perceptual knowledge rather than propositional knowledge in scientific empiricism.
|Keywords||Computational science Theories Models Scientific instruments Syntax Semantics|
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Ian Hacking (1983). Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge University Press.
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Nelson Goodman (1978). Ways of Worldmaking. Harvester Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1947). Meaning and Necessity. University of Chicago Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Eric Winsberg (2009). A Tale of Two Methods. Synthese 169 (3):575 - 592.
Robert W. P. Luk (2010). Understanding Scientific Study Via Process Modeling. Foundations of Science 15 (1):49-78.
Robert W. P. Luk (forthcoming). A Theory of Scientific Study. Foundations of Science:1-28.
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