Emergence, not supervenience

Philosophy of Science Supplement 64 (4):337-45 (1997)
Abstract I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm
Keywords Emergence  Model  Reductionism  Science  Supervenience
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