Philosophy of Science 64 (1):1-17 (1997)
|Abstract||A framework for representing a specific kind of emergent property instance is given. A solution to a generalized version of the exclusion argument is then provided and it is shown that upwards and downwards causation is unproblematical for that kind of emergence. One real example of this kind of emergence is briefly described and the suggestion made that emergence may be more common than current opinions allow|
|Keywords||Causation Emergence Event Metaphysics Property|
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