Hierarchies, similarity, and interactivity in object recognition: “Category-specific” neuropsychological deficits
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):453-476 (2001)
Category-specific impairments of object recognition and naming are among the most intriguing disorders in neuropsychology, affecting the retrieval of knowledge about either living or nonliving things. They can give us insight into the nature of our representations of objects: Have we evolved different neural systems for recognizing different categories of object? What kinds of knowledge are important for recognizing particular objects? How does visual similarity within a category influence object recognition and representation? What is the nature of our semantic knowledge about different objects? We review the evidence on category-specific impairments, arguing that deficits even for one class of object (e.g., living things) cannot be accounted for in terms of a single information processing disorder across all patients; problems arise at contrasting loci in different patients. The same apparent pattern of impairment can be produced by damage to different loci. According to a new processing framework for object recognition and naming, the hierarchical interactive theory (HIT), we have a hierarchy of highly interactive stored representations. HIT explains the variety of patients in terms of (1) lesions at different levels of processing and (2) different forms of stored knowledge used both for particular tasks and for particular categories of object. Key Words: category-specific deficits; functional imaging; hierarchical models; interactive activation models; neuropsychology; object recognition; perceptual and functional knowledge.
|Keywords||category-specific deficits functional imaging hierarchical models interactive activation models neuropsychology object recognition perceptual and functional knowledge|
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Lawrence W. Barsalou, W. Kyle Simmons, Aron K. Barbey & Christine D. Wilson (2003). Grounding Conceptual Knowledge in Modality-Specific Systems. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):84-91.
Yanchao Bi, Xi Yu, Jingyi Geng & F. -Xavier Alario (2010). The Role of Visual Form in Lexical Access: Evidence From Chinese Classifier Production. Cognition 116 (1):101-109.
H. Damasio, D. Tranel, T. Grabowski, R. Adolphs & A. Damasio (2003). Neural Systems Behind Word and Concept Retrieval. Cognition 92 (1-2):179-229.
Alfonso Caramazza & Bradford Z. Mahon (2003). The Organization of Conceptual Knowledge: The Evidence From Category-Specific Semantic Deficits. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (8):354-361.
Friedemann Pulvermüller (2001). Brain Reflections of Words and Their Meaning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (12):517-524.
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