Synthese 108 (2):205-267 (1996)
Several intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions amongst properties, current in the literature, are discussed and contrasted. The proponents of such distinctions tend to present them as competing, but it is suggested here that at least three of the relevant distinctions (including here that between non-relational and relational properties) arise out of separate perfectly legitimate intuitive considerations: though of course different proposed explications of the informal distinctions involved in any one case may well conflict. Special attention is paid to the question of whether a single notion of property is capable of supporting the various distinctions.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413498
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David Lewis (1970). How to Define Theoretical Terms. Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.

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M. Eddon (2011). Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):314-336.
Gabriele Contessa (2013). Dispositions and Interferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):401-419.

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