Intuitionistic Logic and Elementary Rules

Mind 120 (480):1035-1051 (2012)
Abstract
The interplay of introduction and elimination rules for propositional connectives is often seen as suggesting a distinguished role for intuitionistic logic. We prove three formal results concerning intuitionistic propositional logic that bear on that perspective, and discuss their significance. First, for a range of connectives including both negation and the falsum, there are no classically or intuitionistically correct introduction rules. Second, irrespective of the choice of negation or the falsum as a primitive connective, classical and intuitionistic consequence satisfy exactly the same structural, introduction, and elimination (briefly, elementary) rules. Third, for falsum as primitive only, intuitionistic consequence is the least consequence relation that satisfies all classically correct elementary rules
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References found in this work BETA
Arthur Prior (1967). The Runabout Inference Ticket. In Peter Strawson (ed.), Philosophical Logic. Oxford University Press. 38-9.
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Lloyd Humberstone (2000). Contra-Classical Logics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):438 – 474.
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