David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 18 (4):431-442 (2008)
I discuss here a number of different kinds of diachronic emergence, noting that they differ in important ways from synchronic conceptions. I argue that Bedau’s weak emergence has an essentially historical aspect, in that there can be two indistinguishable states, one of which is weakly emergent, the other of which is not. As a consequence, weak emergence is about tokens, not types, of states. I conclude by examining the question of whether the concept of weak emergence is too weak and note that there is at present no unifying account of diachronic and synchronic concepts of emergence.
|Keywords||Cellular automaton Pattern emergence Randomness Supervenience Weak emergence|
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Citations of this work BETA
Philippe Huneman (2012). Determinism, Predictability and Open-Ended Evolution: Lessons From Computational Emergence. Synthese 185 (2):195-214.
Radmarz Hosseinie & Mojtaba Mahzoon (2011). Irreducibility and Emergence in Complex Systems and the Quest for Alternative Insights. Complexity 17 (2):10-18.
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