Some considerations on conditional chances

Four interpretations of single-case conditional propensities are described and it is shown that for each a version of what has been called ‘Humphreys' Paradox’ remains, despite the clarifying work of Gillies, McCurdy and Miller. This entails that propensities cannot be a satisfactory interpretation of standard probability theory. Introduction The basic issue The formal paradox Values of conditional propensities Interpretations of propensities McCurdy's response Miller's response Other possibilities 8.1 Temporal evolution 8.2 Renormalization 8.3 Causal influence Propensities to generate frequencies Conclusion.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/55.4.667
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Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer (2007). Probability in GRW Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):371-389.
Mauricio Suárez (2014). A Critique of Empiricist Propensity Theories. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):215-231.

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