Some thoughts on Wesley salmon's contributions to the philosophy of probability

Philosophy of Science 71 (5):942-949 (2004)
Abstract
Wesley Salmon provided three classic criteria of adequacy for satisfactory interpretations of probability. A fourth criterion is suggested here. A distinction is drawn between frequency‐driven probability models and theory‐driven probability models and it is argued that single case accounts of chance are superior to frequency accounts at least for the latter. Finally it is suggested that theories of chance should be required only to be contingently true, a position which is a natural extension of Salmon's ontic account of probabilistic causality and his own later views on propensities.
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Nuel Belnap (2007). Propensities and Probabilities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):593-625.
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