David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5):395-438 (2001)
We explore a relation we call 'anticipation' between formulas, where A anticipates B (according to some logic) just in case B is a consequence (according to that logic, presumed to support some distinguished implicational connective →) of the formula A → B. We are especially interested in the case in which the logic is intuitionistic (propositional) logic and are much concerned with an extension of that logic with a new connective, written as "a", governed by rules which guarantee that for any formula B, aB is the (logically) strongest formula anticipating B. The investigation of this new logic, which we call ILa, will confront us on several occasions with some of the finer points in the theory of rules and with issues in the philosophy of logic arising from the proposed explication of the existence of a connective (with prescribed logical behaviour) in terms of the conservative extension of a favoured logic by the addition of such a connective. Other points of interest include the provision of a Kripke semantics with respect to which ILa is demonstrably sound, deployed to establish certain unprovability results as well as to forge connections with C. Rauszer's logic of dual intuitionistic negation and dual intuitionistic implication, and the isolation of two relations (between formulas), head-implication and head-linkage, which, though trivial in the setting of classical logic, are of considerable significance in the intuitionistic context
|Keywords||New intuitionistic connectives dual intuitionistic negation rules conservative extension|
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Citations of this work BETA
Lloyd Humberstone (2008). Béziau's Translation Paradox. Theoria 71 (2):138-181.
Lloyd Humberstone (2008). Contrariety and Subcontrariety: The Anatomy of Negation (with Special Reference to an Example of J.-Y. Béziau). Theoria 71 (3):241-262.
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