Variation on a Trivialist Argument of Paul Kabay

Impossible worlds are regarded with understandable suspicion by most philosophers. Here we are concerned with a modal argument which might seem to show that acknowledging their existence, or more particularly, the existence of some hypothetical (we do not say “possible”) world in which everything was the case, would have drastic effects, forcing us to conclude that everything is indeed the case—and not just in the hypothesized world in question. The argument is inspired by a metaphysical (rather than modal-logical) argument of Paul Kabay’s which would have us accept this unpalatable conclusion, though its details bear a closer resemblance to a line of thought developed by Jc Beall, in response to which Graham Priest has made some philosophical moves which are echoed in our diagnosis of what goes wrong with the present modal argument. Logical points of some interest independent of the main issue arise along the way
Keywords Impossible worlds  Modal logic  Trivialism
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DOI 10.1007/s10849-010-9121-x
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References found in this work BETA
Alonzo Church (1956). Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Krister Segerberg (1971). An Essay in Classical Modal Logic. Uppsala,Filosofiska Föreningen Och Filosofiska Institutionen Vid Uppsala Universitet.

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