David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (1):115-132 (2011)
Impossible worlds are regarded with understandable suspicion by most philosophers. Here we are concerned with a modal argument which might seem to show that acknowledging their existence, or more particularly, the existence of some hypothetical (we do not say “possible”) world in which everything was the case, would have drastic effects, forcing us to conclude that everything is indeed the case—and not just in the hypothesized world in question. The argument is inspired by a metaphysical (rather than modal-logical) argument of Paul Kabay’s which would have us accept this unpalatable conclusion, though its details bear a closer resemblance to a line of thought developed by Jc Beall, in response to which Graham Priest has made some philosophical moves which are echoed in our diagnosis of what goes wrong with the present modal argument. Logical points of some interest independent of the main issue arise along the way
|Keywords||Impossible worlds Modal logic Trivialism|
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References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.
Graham Priest (2005). Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. Oxford University Press.
Graham Priest (2005). Towards Non-Being. Clarendon Press.
Alonzo Church (1956). Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Krister Segerberg (1971). An Essay in Classical Modal Logic. Uppsala,Filosofiska Föreningen Och Filosofiska Institutionen Vid Uppsala Universitet.
Citations of this work BETA
Matteo Plebani (2015). Could Everything Be True? Probably Not. Philosophia 43 (2):499-504.
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