David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 65 (2):221-240 (2011)
This paper argues that it is possible to knowingly believe something while judging that one ought not to believe it and (so) viewing the belief as manifesting a sort of failure. I offer examples showing that such ‘alienated belief’ has several potential sources. I contrast alienated belief with self-deception, incontinent (or akratic) belief and half-belief. I argue that the possibility of alienated belief is compatible with the so-called ‘transparency’ of first-person reflection on belief, and that the descriptive and expressive difficulties it involves stem from well-understood sources. I conclude by speculating that endorsed belief is in important respects like intentional action. Reflection on the possibility of alienated belief may thus help us to see one respect in which an agent can be responsible for her attitudes
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References found in this work BETA
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Richard A. Moran (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
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J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Cristina Borgoni (2014). Dissonance and Irrationality: A Criticism of The In‐Between Account of Dissonance Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva (2012). The Normativity of Automaticity. Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.
Cristina Borgoni (2015). Dissonance and Moorean Propositions. Dialectica 69 (1):107-127.
Cristina Borgoni (2015). On Knowing One's Own Resistant Beliefs. Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):212-225.
Maura Tumulty (2014). Managing Mismatch Between Belief and Behavior. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):261-292.
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