Contextual implication

Inquiry 3 (1-4):211 – 258 (1960)
In this essay, I have rejected the inductive interpretation of the paradigm of contextual implication (to say “p”; is to imply that one believes that ) and proposed in its stead an explicatory model according to which a speaker in making a statement contextually implies whatever one is entitled to infer on the basis of the presumption that his act of stating is normal. In developing this model, I show how contextual implication depends on three distinct matters: a stating context, presumptions of normality, and rules for the correct use of expressions.
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DOI 10.1080/00201746008601311
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Hans-Ulrich Hoche (1981). Zur Methodologie Von Kombinationstests in der Analytischen Philosophie. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 12 (1):28-54.

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