David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622 (2013)
Frankfurt cases are purported counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which implies that we are not morally responsible for unavoidable actions. A major permutation of the counterexample strategy features buffered alternatives; this permutation is designed to overcome an influential defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Here we defend the buffering strategy against two recent objections, both of which stress the timing of an agent’s decision. We argue that attributions of moral responsibility aren’t time-sensitive in the way the objectors suppose. We then turn to the crucial question of when an action is relevantly avoidable—when, in the parlance of the literature, an alternative possibility is robust. We call attention to two plausible tests for robustness that merit further consideration, showing that the agents in buffered Frankfurt cases don’t pass these tests, despite being morally responsible for their actions.
|Keywords||Frankfurt cases Buffered alternatives Franklin Palmer Hunt Pereboom|
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References found in this work BETA
Derk Pereboom (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.
David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.) (2003). Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.
Citations of this work BETA
Seth Shabo (2014). It Wasn't Up to Jones: Unavoidable Actions and Intensional Contexts in Frankfurt Examples. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):379-399.
David Palmer (2013). The Timing Objection to the Frankfurt Cases. Erkenntnis 78 (5):1011-1023.
Nadine Elzein (2013). Pereboom's Frankfurt Case and Derivative Culpability. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):553-573.
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