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- Hin-Chung E. Hung (1987). Incommensurability and Inconsistency of Languages. Erkenntnis 27 (3):323 - 352.Incommensurable theories are said to be both incompatible and incomparable. This is paradoxical, because, being incompatible, these theories must have the same subject-matter, yet incomparability implies that their subject-matter is different. This paper's proposed resolution of the paradox makes use of the distinction between internal subject-matter and external subject-matter for languages (frameworks) as outlined by W. Sellars. Incommensurability arises when two languages share the same external subject-matter but differ in internal subject-matter. When they share the same external subject-matter, they can be inconsistent (hence incompatible), and yet incomparable (because they are about distinct internal subject-matter). A substantial part of the paper is devoted to the technical development of the notion of inconsistency as a relationship between languages in contrast to the traditional notion of inconsistency between statements.
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"The subject matter of this book is the mental lexicon, that is, the way in which the form and meaning of words is stored by speakers of specific languages.
Ergative languages make up a substantial percentage of the world’s languages. They have a case system which distinguishes the subject of a transitive verb from that of an intransitive, grouping the latter with the object — that is, the object of a transitive verb and the subject of an intransitive verb are in the same case, which we refer to as the nominative. However, ergative languages differ from one another in important ways. In Greenlandic Eskimo the nominative, whether it is a subject or an object, is syntactically prominent in the clause, much like a subject in English; but in Warlpiri, the nominative is not prominent, more like an object. The variable prominence of the nominative manifests itself as well in the semantics, e.g., default scope of indefinite and quantified nominals. Using data from Greenlandic Eskimo and Warlpiri, and from Hindi, which represents a split ergative system, this paper develops a general theory of case which explains the observed differences amongst ergative languages. In addition, the theory is designed to account for the accusative language type, represented by English.
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There have been some suggestions concerning the subject matter of Islamic psychology. It seems that these suggestions could not overcome the theoretical barrier for providing a subject matter for psychology. Some have considered the divine Spirit (Run) within the human as the subject matter, some others have regarded the Soul (Nafs)and still others, the divine creation of the human (Fitrah) as the candidates for doing the job. However, these suggestions could be challenged in different ways on being able to provide a suitable subject for scientific studies of psychology. The present essay is an introductory attempt to give an alternative. Accordingly, an alternative to the three above mentioned suggestions seems to be the important Islamic concept of Action. We can consider Action as the suitable subject matter for psychology. This is because action is so wide that it could cover all the humans whether believers or non-believers in God, whether their Fitrah is active or silent. An action, as it is used in the Islamic texts, refers to a behavior (being observable or non-observable) that is based on, at least, three kinds of foundations: cognition, emotion, and will. In addition to being a suitable subject for psychology, action is a key concept in referring to the human nature or identity.
There have been, I am afraid, almost as many answers to the question what is logic? as there have been logicians. However, if logic is not to be an obscure "science of everything", we must assume that the majority of the various answers share a common core which does offer a reasonable delimitation of the subject matter of logic. To probe this core, let us start from the answer given by Gottlob Frege (1918/9), the person probably most responsible for modern logic: the subject matter of logic is "truth", and especially its "laws"1. How should we understand the concept of "laws of truth"? The underlying point clearly is that the truth/falsity of our statements is partly a contingent and partly a necessary, lawful matter: that "Paris is in France" is true is a contingent matter, whereas that "Paris is in France or it is not in France" is true is a necessary matter (let us, for the time being, leave aside the Quinean scruples regarding the delimitation of necessarily true statements). Logic,then, should focus on the statements that are true as a matter of law (i.e. necessarily), or, more generally, the truth of which "lawfully depends" on some other statements (i.e. which are true as a matter of law provided these other statements are true). This renders Fregean laws of truth as, in general, a matter of "lawful truth-dependence" - i.e. of entailment or inference (again, let us now disregard any possible difference between these two concepts). This yields a conception of logic as a theory of entailment or inference, a conception which looms behind many other specifications of the subject matter of logic and which, I think, is ultimately correct. However, we can also see the logician – and this is the view we will stick to here – as trying to separate true sentences from false ones; or, equivalently, to map sentences onto truth and falsity. Let us first consider the case of a non-empirical language with a single, definite truth valuation – like the language of Peano arithmetic..
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This is a survey of Aristotle's development of the concept of substance in the Categories and Book VII (Zeta) of the Metaphysics. We begin with the Categories conception of a primary substance as that which is not "in a subject" -- i.e., not ontologically dependent on anything else -- and also not "said of a subject" -- i.e., not predicated of any item beneath it in its categorial tree. This gives us the idea of primary substances as ontologically basic individuals, the fundamental subjects of predication and of change. We then examine the conception of substance in Metaphysics Zeta, where Aristotle is interested not just in the question of what the primary substances are, but in the question of what makes them substances, or, as he would put it, what the "substance OF something" is. The conception of substance that Aristotle ends up with seems (as has been frequently noted) to be threatened with inconsistency, in that Aristotle seems to want to maintain, simultaneously, that (i) substance is form, (ii) form is universal, and (iii) no universal is a substance. Two main approaches toward resolving this inconsistency are considered, and a sketch is provided of how one of these approaches might be fleshed out. On the line I propose, the substantial form of a material compound is predicated accidentally and universally of the matter of that compound, but it is not the substance of the matter of which it is predicated. Rather, it is the substance of itself; but since it is the cause of the compound's being essentially the kind of thing that it is, the substantial form is, in a derivative way, the substance of the compound as well.
The representational content or subject matter of a picture is normally distinguished from various non-representational components of meaning involved in artworks, such as expressive, stylistic or intentional factors. However, I show how such non subject matter components may themselves be analyzed in content terms, if two different categories of representation are recognized--aspect indication for stylistic etc. factors, and normal representation for subject matter content.
On the account given, the relevant kinds of content are hierarchically structured, with relatively unconceptualized lower level aspectual contents encoding or symbolizing higher level conceptualized representational subject matter. Such an account is strongly supported by the latest findings of cognitive science regarding levels of conceptualization. The paper also demonstrates how the account given is compatible with the actual pictorial competence of normal viewers of visual artworks.
Of those that exist, some are said of a subject, but are in no subject: as man is said of some subject, namely of some man, but is in no subject. Others, however, are in a subject, but are said of no subject. And I say that to be in a subject which, while it is in something not as a part, cannot exist apart from the thing in which it is. For example, some particular literacy is in a subject, namely in the soul, but is not said of any subject, and this whiteness is in a body as in its subject, for any color is in a body. Others both are said of and are in a subject. For example, knowledge is in the soul, and is said of a subject, say, of literacy. Still others neither are in a subject, nor are said of a subject, for example, some particular man, or some particular horse: for none of these is either in or is said of a subject. In general, individuals, and what are numerically one are said of no subject, but nothing prevents them from being in a subject, for some particular literacy is in a subject.
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_the subject matter assumption_ . Perry suggests that the subject matter assumption is false.
It has been suggested that biological theories differ from physical theories because the subject matter of biology differs from the subject matter of physics especially in the fact that living bodies are more complex than nonliving bodies. It is shown that the interactional complexity of living bodies can only be expressed by invoking biological theories. The claim that living bodies are complex is, therefore, ultimately a claim about the nature of scientific theories rather than a claim about the nature of the subject matter of biology resting upon a presystematic judgement.
Discussion of Hin-Chung E. Hung, Incommensurability and inconsistency of languages
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