Review symposium on Searle : II. Searle's the construction of social reality

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (1):122-131 (1998)
The Construction of Social Reality can be read at different levels, and this makes it hard to assess. At one level, it is a stunningly clear, comprehensive, and extremely simple introduction to the foundations of the social sciences. At another level, it is an idiosyncratic and interesting statement by a philoso pher of note who writes in a field with which he is barely acquainted. And at yet another level, it is a philosophical treatment of certain philosophical problems that Searle's independent reflections on the nature and possibility of social reality have disclosed. Different readers will find different things in Searle's book. What I found is an original contribution to a theory of institu tional facts and to a certain kind of restricted idealism that Anscombe (1976) called "linguistic idealism.".
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    Sam Page (2004). Searle's Realism Deconstructed. Philosophical Forum 35 (3):249-274.
    John R. Searle (2004). Realism Reconstructed: A Reply. Philosophical Forum 35 (3):275–280.
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