David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 87 (2):119-141 (1997)
What I wish to consider here is how understanding something is related to the justiﬁcation of beliefs about what it means. Suppose, for instance, that S understands the name “Clinton” and has a justiﬁed belief that it names Clinton. How is S’s understanding related to that belief’s justiﬁcation? Or suppose that S understands the sentence “Clinton is President”, or Jones’ assertive utterance of it, and has a justiﬁed belief that that sentence expresses the proposition that Clinton is President, or that Jones said that Clinton is President. How is S’s understanding related to the justiﬁcations of these beliefs?
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Christopher Peacocke (2005). The a Priori. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Robin Jeshion (2000). On the Obvious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):333 - 355.
Robin Jeshion (2000). On the Obvious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):333-355.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads38 ( #47,831 of 1,099,791 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #126,844 of 1,099,791 )
How can I increase my downloads?