Weakness and compulsion: the essential difference

Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):81-97 (2011)
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References found in this work BETA
David C. Blumenfeld (1988). Freedom and Mind Control. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (July):215-27.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.

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Robert N. Audi (1974). Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):1-14.
Richard Holton (1999). Intention and Weakness of Will. Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241-262.
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