Weakness and compulsion: the essential difference

Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):81-97 (2011)
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    References found in this work BETA
    David C. Blumenfeld (1988). Freedom and Mind Control. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (July):215-27.
    Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
    Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.

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