Online research in philosophy

Abstract : Libet’s famous experiments, showing that apparently we become aware of our intention to act only after we have unconsciously formed it, have widely been taken to show that there is no such thing as free will. If we are not conscious of the formation of our intentions, many people think, we do not exercise the right kind of control over them. I argue that the claim this view presupposes, that only consciously initiated actions could be free, places a condition upon freedom of action which it is in principle impossible to fulfil, for reasons that are conceptual and not merely contingent. Exercising this kind of control would require that we control our control system, which would simply cause the same problem to arise at a higher-level or initiate an infinite regress of controllings. If the unconscious initiation of actions, as well as the takings of decisions, is incompatible with control over them, then free will is impossible on conceptual grounds. Thus, Libet’s experiments do not constitute a separate, empirical, challenge to our freedom.

After outlining why the notion of conscious control of action matters to us and after distinguishing different challenges to that notion, the contribution focuses on the challenge posed by the literature on unconscious goal pursuit. Based on a conceptual clarification of the notion of consciousness, I argue that the understanding of consciousness in that literature is too restricted. The hypothesis that the behaviors reported can be accounted for by nonconceptual forms of consciousness, such as emotions and motor experiences, rather than by—conscious or unconscious—conceptual level intentions tends to be disregarded, even though it promises to be empirically fruitful.

The association between media literacy and media ethics is discussed in this essay, and data gathered from a media literacy study with 93 public school 6th-grade students are presented. The study details the introduction and evaluation of a media literacy program that was intended to encourage learning and critical thinking about media violence, using a selection of "high-risk" portrayal factors as a foundation. Statistical comparisons between preprogram and postprogram responses and between those participating and those in a control group show some increases in the comprehension of key concepts used in the study of media violence and critical thinking about the topic. Open-ended responses also demonstrate enhanced sophistication in analyzing media violence after participating in the program.

The authors reject a computationally powerful unconscious. Instead, they suggest that simple unconscious processes give rise to complex conscious representations. We discuss evidence showing contrastive effects of conscious and unconscious processes, suggesting a distinction between these types of processes. In our view, conscious processes often serve to correct or control negative consequences of relatively simple unconscious processes.

Our interest in unconscious motives is not only theoretical; it is also practical, moral. Unconscious motives often perform a useful function, but this may be bought at too high a price. Special therapeutic techniques may be needed to liberate a person from the grip of an unconscious motive. Such a liberation is possible because unconscious motives operate within the larger area of conscious self-control. The goal of rational behavior is to enlarge this area of self-control by greater self-knowledge. The limits of self-knowledge and self-control are flexible, and it is desirable to extend them as far as possible.

Susan Hurley has argued against a well known argument for freedom of speech, the argument from autonomy, on the basis of two hypotheses about violence in the media and aggressive behaviour. The first hypothesis says that exposure to media violence causes aggressive behaviour; the second, that humans have an innate tendency to copy behaviour in ways that bypass conscious deliberation. I argue, first, that Hurley is not successful in setting aside the argument from autonomy. Second, I show that the empirical data are irrelevant to statutory regulation of media violence. They do not yield a sufficiently strong correlation between exposure to media violence and non-autonomously copied criminal violence, and they do not yield a way ex ante to individuate the viewers who will be affected by media violence.

Susan Hurley has argued against a well known argument for freedom of speech, the argument from autonomy, on the basis of two hypotheses about violence in the media and aggressive behaviour. The first hypothesis says that exposure to media violence causes aggressive behaviour; the second, that humans have an innate tendency to copy behaviour in ways that bypass conscious deliberation. I argue, first, that Hurley is not successful in setting aside the argument from autonomy. Second, I show that the empirical data are irrelevant to statutory regulation of media violence. They do not yield a sufficiently strong correlation between exposure to media violence and non-autonomously copied criminal violence, and they do not yield a way ex ante to individuate the viewers who will be affected by media violence.