David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):131-168 (2003)
and apply it to various examples of neural plasticity in which input is rerouted intermodally or intramodally to nonstandard cortical targets. In some cases but not others, cortical activity ‘defers’ to the nonstandard sources of input. We ask why, consider some possible explanations, and propose a dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis. We believe that this distinction is important and worthy of further study, both philosophical and empirical, whether or not our hypothesis turns out to be correct. In particular, the question of how the distinction should be explained is linked to explanatory gap issues for consciousness. Comparative and absolute explanatory gaps should be distinguished: why does neural activity in a particular area of cortex have this qualitative expression rather than that, and why does it have any qualitative expression at all? We use the dominance/deference distinction to address the comparative gaps, both intermodal and intramodal (not the absolute gap). We do so not by inward scrutiny but rather by expanding our gaze to include relations between brain, body and environment
|Keywords||Brain Consciousness Experience Neural Plasticity Science|
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Mirko Farina (2013). Neither Touch nor Vision: Sensory Substitution as Artificial Synaesthesia? Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):639-655.
Andy Clark (2009). Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness is (Probably) Still in the Head. Mind 118 (472):963-993.
Dustin Stokes (2013). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
Mark Rowlands (2009). Enactivism and the Extended Mind. Topoi 28 (1):53-62.
Andreas Elpidorou (2010). Alva Noë: Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons From the Biology of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (1):155-159.
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