Newcomb's problem, prisoners' dilemma, and collective action

Synthese 86 (2):173 - 196 (1991)
Abstract
Among various cases that equally admit of evidentialist reasoning, the supposedly evidentialist solution has varying degrees of intuitive attractiveness. I suggest that cooperative reasoning may account for the appeal of apparently evidentialist behavior in the cases in which it is intuitively attractive, while the inapplicability of cooperative reasoning may account for the unattractiveness of evidentialist behaviour in other cases. A collective causal power with respect to agreed outcomes, not evidentialist reasoning, makes cooperation attractive in the Prisoners' Dilemma. And a natural though unwarranted assumption of such a power may account for the intuitive appeal of the one-box response in Newcomb's Problem.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Isaac Levi (1982). A Note on Newcombmania. Journal of Philosophy 79 (6):337-342.
    Isaac Levi (1975). Newcomb's Many Problems. Theory and Decision 6 (2):161-175.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Christopher Woodard (2011). Rationality and the Unit of Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):261-277.
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