Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity

Oxford University Press (1989)
Abstract
Hurley here revives a classical idea about rationality in a modern framework, by developing analogies between the structure of personality and the structure of society in the context of contemporary work in philosophy of mind, ethics, decision theory and social choice theory. The book examines the rationality of decisions and actions, and illustrates the continuity of philosophy of mind on the one hand, and ethics and jurisprudence on the other. A major thesis of the book is that arguments drawn from the philosophy of mind may be used to undermine widely-held subjectivist positions in ethics and politico-economic theory. The work is inspired by the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Davidson, but goes on to connect their arguments about interpretation with formal work in decision theory and social choice theory, and with the theory of adjudication.
Keywords Decision making Moral and ethical aspects  Jurisprudence
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $12.52 used (84% off)   $41.28 new (45% off)   $69.98 direct from Amazon (6% off)    Amazon page
Call number BJ1419.H87 1989
ISBN(s) 0195080122   9780195080124
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,802
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Philip Pettit (1993). Negative Liberty, Liberal and Republican. European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):15-38.

View all 32 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

6 ( #211,162 of 1,099,739 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #303,379 of 1,099,739 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.