Oxford University Press (1993)
Hurka gives an account of perfectionism, which holds that certain states of humans, such as knowledge, achievement and friendship are good apart from any pleasure they may bring, and that the morally right act is always the one that most promotes these states. Beginning with an analysis of its central concepts, Hurka tries to regain for perfectionism a central place in contemporary moral debate
Keywords Perfection   Ethics   Common good
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ISBN(s) 9780195101164     0195080149 (hbk)
DOI 10.2307/2219860
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Gwen Bradford (2013). The Value of Achievements. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):204-224.
Ralph Wedgwood (2009). Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action. In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 342-363.

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