David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2006)
To what extent can animal behaviour be described as rational? What does it even mean to describe behaviour as rational? This book focuses on one of the major debates in science today - how closely does mental processing in animals resemble mental processing in humans. It addresses the question of whether and to what extent non-human animals are rational, that is, whether any animal behaviour can be regarded as the result of a rational thought processes. It does this with attention to three key questions, which recur throughout the book and which have both empirical and philosophical aspects: What kinds of behavioural tasks can animals successfully perform? What if any mental processes must be postulated to explain their performance at these tasks? What properties must processes have to count as rational? The book is distinctive in pursuing these questions not only in relation to our closest relatives, the primates, whose intelligence usually gets the most attention, but also in relation to birds and dolphins, where striking results are also being obtained. Some chapters focus on a particular species. They describe some of the extraordinary and complex behaviour of these species - using tools in novel ways to solve foraging problems, for example, or behaving in novel ways to solve complex social problems - and ask whether such behaviour should be explained in rational or merely mechanistic terms. Other chapters address more theoretical issues and ask, for example, what it means for behaviour to be rational, and whether rationality can be understood in the absence of language. The book includes many of the world's leading figures doing empirical work on rationality in primates, dolphins, and birds, as well as distinguished philosophers of mind and science. The book includes an editors' introduction which summarises the philosophical and empirical work presented, and draws together the issues discussed by the contributors.
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Michael Tomasello & Call & Josep, Do Chimpanzees Know What Others See - or Only What They Are Looking At?
Nicky Clayton, Nathan Emery & Dickinson & Anthony, The Rationality of Animal Memory: Complex Caching Strategies of Western Scrub Jays.
E. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, Duane M. Rumbaugh & Fields & M. William, Language as a Window on Rationality.
Michael Tomasello & Josep Call, Do Chimpanzees Know What Others See - or Only What They Are Looking At?
Alain J.-P. C. Tschudin, Belief Attribution Tasks with Dolphins: What Social Minds Can Reveal About Animal Rationality.
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Susan Hurley (2008). The Shared Circuits Model (SCM): How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation, Deliberation, and Mindreading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
Cameron Buckner (2014). The Semantic Problem(s) with Research on Animal Mind‐Reading. Mind and Language 29 (5):566-589.
Robert Lurz (2009). If Chimpanzees Are Mindreaders, Could Behavioral Science Tell? Toward a Solution of the Logical Problem. Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):305-328.
Dermot Moran (2013). Intentionality: Some Lessons From the History of the Problem From Brentano to the Present. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.
Robert W. Lurz & Carla Krachun (2011). How Could We Know Whether Nonhuman Primates Understand Others' Internal Goals and Intentions? Solving Povinelli's Problem. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):449-481.
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