David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Heather D. Battaly (ed.), Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Wiley-Blackwell 58-72 (2010)
Abstract: The concepts of virtue and right action are closely connected, in that we expect people with virtuous motives to at least often act rightly. Two well-known views explain this connection by defining one of the concepts in terms of the other. Instrumentalists about virtue identify virtuous motives as those that lead to right acts; virtue-ethicists identify right acts as those that are or would be done from virtuous motives. This essay outlines a rival explanation, based on the "higher-level" account of virtue defended in the author's Virtue, Vice, and Value . On this account rightness and virtue go together because each is defined by a (different) relation to some other, more basic moral concept. Their frequent coincidence is therefore like a correlation between A and B based not on either's causing the other but on their being joint effects of a single common cause.
|Keywords||virtue motives right action|
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References found in this work BETA
W. D. Ross (2002). The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press.
Rosalind Hursthouse (1999/2001). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Michael A. Slote (2001). Morals From Motives. Oxford University Press.
John Finnis (1980/1979). Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford University Press.
G. E. Moore (1903/2004). Principia Ethica. Dover Publications.
Citations of this work BETA
Guy Axtell (2010). Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):73-94.
Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2012). Virtue or Consequences: The Folk Against Pure Evaluational Internalism. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):702-717.
Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins & Bradley J. Strawser (2015). Autonomous Machines, Moral Judgment, and Acting for the Right Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):851-872.
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