David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Ethics 2 (4):299-320 (1998)
This paper distinguishes two interpretations of G. E. Moore''s principle of organic unities, which says that the intrinsic value of a whole need not equal the sum of the intrinsic values its parts would have outside it. A holistic interpretation, which was Moore''s own, says that parts retain their values when they enter a whole but that there can be an additional value in the whole as a whole that must be added to them. The conditionality interpretation, which has been defended by Korsgaard, says that parts can change their values when they enter wholes, so no additional value is needed. The paper shows that the two interpretations, which differ on such apparently important issues as the nature of intrinsic value, can always yield the same conclusions about the overall value in a state of affairs, so there is in that sense nothing to choose between them. At the same time, though, the differences between the interpretations make sometimes one and sometimes the other more appropriate for expressing a given evaluative view. In this last connection the paper considers views about beauty, posthumous achievement, vices of disproportion, deserved and compassionate pain, and undeserved and malicious pleasure.
|Keywords||desert G. E. Moore holism intrinsic value pleasure value wholes|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ben Bradley (2004). When is Death Bad for the One Who Dies? Noûs 38 (1):1–28.
Nathan Hanna (2013). Two Claims About Desert. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):41-56.
Dominic McIver Lopes (2008). Virtues of Art: Good Taste. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):197-211.
Sandy Berkovski (2012). The Possibility of Modified Hedonism. Theoria 78 (3):186-212.
Daniel Halliday (2013). Holism About Value: Some Help for Invariabilists. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1033-1046.
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