Graduate studies at Western
Ethics 93 (3):496-507 (1983)
|Abstract||Just because an angel is better than a stone, it does not follow that two angels are better than one angel and one stone. So said Aquinas (Summa contra Gentiles III, 71), and the sentiment was echoed by Leibniz. In section 118 of the Theodicy he wrote: "No substance is either absolutely precious or absolutely contemptible in the sight of God. It is certain that God attaches more importance to a man than to a lion, but I do not know that we can bc sure that he prefers one man to an entire species of lions." Even Kant was bitten by this bug. In one of his pre-Critical works he was moved to say, à propos of lice, that even though they “may in our eyes be as worthless as you like, nevertheless it is of more consequence to Nature to conserve this species as a whole than to conserve a small number of members of a superior species." In these passages Aquinas, Leibniz, and Kant gave expression to a distinctive and interesting view about the value of animal species and animal populations. At its simplest, this is the view that there is a special value in the existence of animal species or in the existence of a wide variety of different animal species. But the view also goes deeper than this. An animal species, after all, is nothing over and above the individual animals which make it up, and the value which it contributes to the world must therefore be some function of the values contributed by those individual animals. At the deepest level, what the view expressed by Aquinas, Leibniz, and Kant holds is that the value which an individual animal contributes to thc world is not constant but varies with the number..|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Marc Bekoff (1997). Deep Ethology, Animal Rights, and the Great Ape/Animal Project: Resisting Speciesism and Expanding the Community of Equals. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 10 (3):269-296.
Yew-Kwang Ng (1995). Towards Welfare Biology: Evolutionary Economics of Animal Consciousness and Suffering. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 10 (3):255-285.
Rob De Vries (2006). Genetic Engineering and the Integrity of Animals. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (5):469-493.
Eugene C. Hargrove (1987). Foundations of Wildlife Protection Attitudes. Inquiry 30 (1 & 2):3 – 31.
Mark Greene (2011). On the Origin of Species Notions and Their Ethical Limitations. In Tom L. Beauchamp & R. G. Frey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Mark Rowlands (2009). Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan.
Lilly-Marlene Russow (1981). Why Do Species Matter? Environmental Ethics 3 (2):101-112.
Jac Swart & Jozef Keulartz (2011). Wild Animals in Our Backyard. A Contextual Approach to the Intrinsic Value of Animals. Acta Biotheoretica 59 (2):185-200.
Marc Bekoff & Lofe Gruen (1993). Animal Welfare and Individual Characteristics: A Conversation Against Speciesism. Ethics and Behavior 3 (2):163 – 175.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads37 ( #36,967 of 722,941 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,098 of 722,941 )
How can I increase my downloads?