Online research in philosophy

Shannon Shipp argues for the Modified Vendetta Sanction as a method of corporate-collective punishment. He claims that this sanction evades the difficulties of Peter French's Hester Prynne Sanction. In this paper I argue that, though the Modified Vendetta Sanction evades the problems that Shipp poses for it, it fails to evade some of the difficulties that I pose for French's method. Moreover, there are some difficulties that plague the Modified Vendetta Sanction which do not count against the Hester Prynne Sanction. Therefore, if my analysis holds, then Shipp's method neither improves significantly on the Hester Prynne Sanction nor is unproblematic in its own right. The significance of this paper is that it foils yet another attempt by some corporate punishment theorists to establish the plausibility of a method of corporate-collective punishment.

Many of us assume we must either oppose or support gun control. Not so. We have a range of alternatives. Even this way of speaking oversimplifies our choices since there are two distinct scales on which to place alternatives. One scale concerns the degree (if at all) to which guns should be abolished. This scale moves from those who want no abolition (NA) of any guns, through those who want moderate abolition (MA) - to forbid access to some subclasses of guns - to those who want absolute abolition (AA). The second scale concerns the restrictions (if any) on those guns that are available to private citizens. This scale moves from those who want absolute restrictions (AR) through those who want moderate restrictions (MR) to those who want no restrictions (NR) at all. Restrictions vary not only in strength but also in content. We could restrict who owns guns, how they obtain them, where and how they store them, and where and how they can carry them.

Five pre-eminent legal theorists tackle a range of fundamental questions on the nature of the philosophy of criminal law. Their essays explore the extent to which and the ways in which our systems of criminal law can be seen as rational and principled. The essays discuss some of the principles by which, it is often thought, a system of law should be structured, and they ask whether our own systems are genuinely principled or riven by basic contradictions, reflecting deeper political and social conflicts. The volume as a whole shows how lively and exciting contemporary legal theory can be.

The distinction between 'conduct norms' and 'sanction norms' is widely assumed to be an essential tool for any correct understanding of criminal responsibility. Conduct norms (often also called 'primary') are referred to with the language of 'prohibitions', and it is normally accepted that a crime is by definition a 'prohibited' human behaviour, in the sense that it is always an infraction of a 'conduct norm'. I mean to discuss and criticize this rather consensual assumption. Modern criminal codes don't usually incorporate a catalogue of prohibitions, but this is considered to be of no consequence when it comes to discuss whether the law prohibits those behaviours whose performance may lead to the application of a criminal sanction: there is no question that sanction norms may be properly read out of the special parts of our criminal codes, and from a sanction norm it is always possible to infer the correspondent prohibition. Or so the current understanding goes. I shall first try to make some sense of this common idea, which I call the inference thesis. I will then proceed to show why it is wrong. The inference thesis is necessarily committed to an understanding of conduct norms as prescriptive norms addressed to citizens, and the relevant notion of a prescriptive norm has to be characterized in some detail. Having done so, I will argue that such a prescriptive understanding of 'conduct norms' is incompatible with several aspects common to most modern systems of criminal law and unquestionably essential to the concept of a crime.

George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, xi + 223 pp.

Douglas N. Husak, Drugs and Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, vii + 312 pp.