Wittgenstein on Modernism and the Causal Point of View

Abstract Wittgenstein expressed an antipathy to modernism from his earliest work to his latest. He connected modernism with modern science and with what hecalled “the causal point of view.” The causal point of view, which operates like a presupposition or pre-dispositional attitude, blocks a clear vision of the richnessand complexity of the world and human life, and denies access to a religious point of view and the benefits of faith. His analysis of the causal point of view lays bare the uncritically accepted place it holds in our thinking and helps to relieve the anxiety felt over the idea of causal necessity that accompanies it. Wittgenstein’sworld-view and larger philosophical tasks are often easily lost in the details of his analyses and remarks, but not here as he unpacks the reasons for his discomfiture with the assumptions of the modern world
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,705
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Jennifer Hornsby (1993). Agency and Causal Explanation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    Sheldon R. Smith (2007). Causation and Its Relation to 'Causal Laws'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):659 - 688.
    Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez & René J. Campis (2008). Did I Do It? Yeah, You Did! On Wittgenstein and Libet on Free Will. In Hannes Leitgeb & Alexander Hieke (eds.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    Rachel Cohon (1997). The Common Point of View in Hume's Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):827-850.
    John I. Biro (2006). A Point of View on Points of View. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):3-12.
    Muñoz-Suárez Carlos M. & Campis René J. (2008). DID I DO IT? -YEAH, YOU DID! Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences:34- 37.
    Paul Coates (1998). Perception and Metaphysical Skepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (72):1-28.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

    Added to index

    2012-09-18

    Total downloads

    0

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    0

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums