David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):424-449 (2013)
: Radical meta-normative skepticism is the view that no standard, norm, or principle has objective authority or normative force. It does not deny that there are norms, standards of correctness, and principles of various kinds that render it possible that we succeed or fail in measuring up to their prerogatives. Rather, it denies that any norm has the status of commanding with objective authority, of giving rise to normative reasons to take seriously and follow its demands. Two powerful transcendental arguments challenge this view. First, skepticism is said to be self-defeating: Settling what to accept, and in particular whether to accept skepticism, appears to be a reason-guided enterprise. How can skeptics coherently support their view by citing reasons in their favor after they just rejected them throughout? Second, there is the practical-deliberative version, most recently developed by David Enoch: We are essentially deliberative creatures. Yet deliberation appears to require that there are correct answers in the form of normative reasons to our practical questions. Thus confidence in the sensible nature of deliberation should inspire confidence in reasons. The essay undermines both transcendental arguments by demonstrating, first, how to support skepticism without deserting its tenets, and, second, how to deliberate in skeptical fashion
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Russ Shafer-Landau (2003/2005). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2000). Practical Reality. Oxford University Press.
Thomas Nagel (1986). The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Benjamin Vilhauer (2012). Taking Free Will Skepticism Seriously. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):833 - 852.
Herman Cappelen (2005). Pluralistic Skepticism: Advertisement for Speech Act Pluralism. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):15–39.
Jill Rusin (2012). Characterizing Skepticisms Import. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):99-114.
Adrian Bardon (2006). The Aristotelian Prescription: Skepticism, Retortion, and Transcendental Arguments. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):263-276.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1986). Skepticism About Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
Donald C. Hubin (1999). Converging on Values. Analysis 59 (264):355–361.
Jennifer M. Morton (2013). Deliberating for Our Far Future Selves. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):809-828.
Adrian Bardon (2005). Performative Transcendental Arguments. Philosophia 33 (1-4):69-95.
Andrew Reisner (2007). Evidentialism and the Numbers Game. Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
Attila Tanyi (2006). An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model. Dissertation, Central European University
Paul Kurtz (2010). Exuberant Skepticism. Prometheus Books 59 John Glenn Drive.
Ken O'Day (1998). Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):61-87.
G. F. Schueler (2003). Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action. Oxford University Press.
Eric Vogelstein (2011). Morality, Reasons, and Sentiments. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.
Added to index2011-02-24
Total downloads67 ( #61,723 of 1,793,090 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #138,006 of 1,793,090 )
How can I increase my downloads?