David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins. 15-43 (2001)
There are two importantly different ways in which consciousness resists incorporation into our familiar object-based conceptual schema which, when analysed, help to explain why it is regarded as such a philosophically recalcitrant phenomena. One concerns the nonconceptual nature of basic forms of conscious experience, the other concerns the fact that attempts to understand the nature of such experience in an object-based schema, as is demanded by some forms of physicalism, is inappropriate. My concern in this paper is to show how certain central problems concerning our attempts to understand consciousness can be recast or dissolved if we take note of these aspects of phenomenal experience. Before addressing these issues a few words of clarification are in order. Without refinements, talk of schema has Kantian overtones. For example, consider Tye’s claim that, “Once the sensory input is brought under the appropriate schema, belief formation can take place” (Tye 1996: 66).1 Nevertheless, it is useful to talk of ‘schema’ specifically in order to waylay confusion with an issue, which Davidson long ago advertised about the impossibility of there being radically different conceptual schemes. Since I will be denying that our concepts of phenomenal consciousness can be incorporated into an object-based schema, it might be thought that advocating the existence of incommensurable conceptual schema ignores Davidson’s important lesson concerning radically different conceptual schemes. But it does not. Davidson’s point concerns the radical interpretation of an alien language of which we can make no sense. In contrast, what we have here is two different schema, both of..
|Keywords||*Concepts *Consciousness States *Philosophies *Schema|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Christopher Gauker (2001). T-Schema Deflationism Versus Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. Analysis 61 (270):129–136.
Luca Moretti (2007). A Thick Realist Consequence of Wright's Minimalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):24–38.
H. E. Tödt (1978). Towards a Theory of Making Ethical Judgments. Journal of Religious Ethics 6 (1):108 - 120.
Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Cole (1995). Body Image and Body Schema in a Deafferented Subject. Journal of Mind and Behavior 16:369-390.
Robert W. Kentridge & Charles A. Heywood (2000). Metacognition and Awareness. Consciousness And Cognition 9 (2):308-312.
Helena De Preester & Veroniek Knockaert (eds.) (2005). Body Image and Body Schema. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Virginia Slaughter (2004). Emulator as Body Schema. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):415-416.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads54 ( #24,558 of 1,088,810 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #42,743 of 1,088,810 )
How can I increase my downloads?